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A Tryst with the Transcendentals: 
C.S. Lewis on Beauty, Truth, and Goodness 
Part II: Truth 
 
Donald T. Williams 




“Beauty is truth, truth beauty.  That is 
all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to 
know,” says Keats’ Grecian Urn.  If the 
Romantics tended to conflate Truth and 
Beauty, the Moderns tended to explain Beauty 
away as a mere subjective emotional 
response; and now some Post-Moderns seem 
to do the same with Truth itself.  C. S. Lewis, 
rooted in the classical Christian world view, 
sought a more whole vision of the relations 
among the Transcendentals than any of these 
other approaches can provide.  As we 
summarized that Christian view in part one of 
this study, truth when we find it in the world 
is a reflection of God’s mind, goodness of His 
character, and beauty of His glory, impressed 
into the very fabric of what He has made (see 
Kreeft 23-5).  We started with Beauty in part 
one because it was Beauty, coming through 
Joy, or sehnsucht, that led Lewis to Truth.  But 
to Truth he believed he had arrived.  What 
was Lewis’s view of Truth?  How did he 
defend it against the Reductionisms prevalent 
in the middle of the Twentieth Century?   Can 
that defense still help us to withstand the 
assaults typical of our own times?  These are 
the questions on which we shall attempt to 
shed some light.  In our age of Post-
Modernism and Post-Foundationalism when 
the very concept of truth is subject to 
deconstruction, there are hardly any more 




THE NATURE OF TRUTH 
 
 Simply put, C. S. Lewis held to the 
classical “correspondence theory” of truth:  
Truth is a property of propositions such that 
their content corresponds to the state of 
affairs in the real and objective external 
world which they assert to be so.  So far Lewis 
is not original in his concept of truth.  His 
contribution at this point is helping us to a 
fuller and richer understanding of what it 
means to hold such a concept.   
For example, he complains,   
If naturalists do not claim to know any 
truths, ought they not to have warned 
us rather earlier of the fact?  For really 
from all the books they have written, in 
which the behaviour of the remotest 
nebula, the shyest proton, and the most 
prehistoric man are described, one 
would have got the idea that they were 
claiming to give us a true account of 
real things.  (Miracles 24). 
The key words here are “account” and “real 
things.”  Truth is propositional; it is an 
account.  The person holding to these 
propositions, i.e., making this account, may 
not be capable of perfect objectivity.  Indeed, 
if he is a finite human being, he cannot be; but 
his account is an account of objective reality 
nonetheless, of real things.  And he can in 
theory overcome his subjectivity sufficiently 
to verify the truth of his account, if indeed the 
nebulae, protons, and cavemen behave as his 
propositions claim they do; if the state of 
affairs they assert “obtains” in the real world. 
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 The theoretical possibility of thus 
sufficiently overcoming our subjectivity—and 
knowing when we have done so—is then 
essential to our ability to perceive, know, and 
state truth as correspondence.  Traditional 
philosophy and nihilistic Post-Modernism 
actually agree on this point; they part 
company on the question of whether that 
possibility exists.  Lewis argues that it has to:  
The reason why your idea of New York 
can be truer or less true than mine is 
that New York is a real place, existing 
quite apart from what either of us 
thinks.  If, when each of us said “New 
York” each meant merely “The town I 
am imagining in my own head,” how 
could one of us have truer ideas than 
the other?  There would be no question 
of truth or falsehood at all.  (Mere 
Christianity 25)   
Post-Kantian relativism, before we 
even arrive at Post-Structuralism and 
Deconstruction, holds that the real objective 
New York, the New York an sich, is 
unreachable, and that therefore only the 
phenomenal New York, the one that exists as 
an image constructed in our heads, can be 
directly known. Common sense would seem 
to be on the side of Lewis and the older 
Tradition, though; for there actually is a real 
New York, and the simple expedient of 
visiting it can determine which of two 
accounts of it is closer to the reality, so that 
the town being imagined in one head can be 
rejected in favor of that being imagined in the 
other for good and sufficient reason—to wit, 
the town existing outside of either head.  Is 
Times Square in Manhattan, Brooklyn, 
Queens, Staten Island, or the Bronx?  Unless 
the real New York outside our heads both 
exists and is accessible to our heads, the 
question is unanswerable.  But the question is 
in fact answerable; therefore, truth must be 
what Lewis conceived it to be, an account of 
New York that is theoretically capable of 
getting what we think closer to the real place 
that exists quite apart from what any of us 
thinks.   
 The existence of truth in this sense 
entails the existence of falsehood.  Of 
contradictory propositions, only one of them 
can be true, and if that one is true, the other 
must perforce be false.  “Your Hindus 
certainly sound delightful,” Lewis wrote to 
Dom Bede Griffiths, “But what do they deny?  
That’s always been my trouble with Indians—
to find any proposition they would pronounce 
false.  But truth surely must involve 
exclusions?” (Letters 3:704).  A precondition 
of truth then is the universal validity of the 
law of non-contradiction.  Two contradictory 
propositions cannot both be true in the same 
way, in the same place, at the same time.  If 
they could, the claim that either was true 
would be empty. 
In other words, a true thought 
“reflects,” not just the mind of the thinker, but 
“universal reality” (“De Futilitate” 60).  
“Christianity claims to give you an account of 
facts—to tell you what the real universe is 
like” (“Man or Rabbit?” 108). One who claims 
anything less is simply not claiming that 
Christianity (or any other account of the state 
of things) is true.   
 The radical nature of this concern for 
truth was apparent already by the middle of 
the Twentieth Century, as can be seen by 
looking at some of the typical academic 
concerns of late Modernism with which Lewis 
contrasts it. 
What makes some theological works 
like sawdust to me is the way the 
authors can go on discussing how far 
certain positions are adjustable to 
contemporary thought, or beneficial in 
relation to social problems, or “have a 
future” before them, but never squarely 
ask what grounds we have for 
supposing them to be true accounts of 
any objective reality.  (Malcolm 104) 
Screwtape encourages Wormwood to make 
good use of such an intellectual climate: 
Your man has been accustomed, ever 
since he was a boy, to have a dozen 
incompatible philosophies dancing 
about together inside his head.  He 
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doesn’t think of doctrines as primarily 
“true” or “false,” but as “academic” or 
“practical,” “outworn” or 
“contemporary,” “conventional” or 
“ruthless.”  Jargon, not argument, is 
your best ally in keeping him from the 
Church.  Don’t waste time trying to 
make him think materialism is true!  
Make him think it is strong or stark or 
courageous—that it is the philosophy 
of the future. (Screwtape 8) 
In the intellectual climate which we 
have at last succeeded in producing 
throughout western Europe, you 
needn’t bother about that [the fact that 
earlier writers like Boethius had told 
the truth].  Only the learned read old 
books, and we have now so dealt with 
the learned that they are of all men the 
least likely to acquire wisdom by doing 
so. . . . When a learned man is presented 
with any statement in an ancient 
author, the one question he never asks 
is whether it is true.  He asks who 
influenced the ancient writer, and how 
far the statement is consistent with 
what he said in other books, and what 
phase in the writer’s development, or in 
the general history of thought it 
illustrates, and how it affected later 
writers, and how often it has been 
misunderstood . . . and what the course 
of criticism has been on it for the last 
ten years, and what is the “present 
state of the question.” (Screwtape 128-
9) 
Now in the Post-Modern world we 
have added concerns for what racial, class, or 
gendered interests the ideas in question 
advance, how they fit into or illustrate the 
power-broking structures of society, etc.  It is 
not that these questions, or the ones Lewis 
noticed (which are still with us), are always 
devoid of interest, legitimacy, or relevance.  
They become problematic when they are 
used as a substitute for the search for truth, a 
way of endlessly deferring the question of 
truth, which is thought to be unattainable 
anyway.  And that is precisely how they often 
do function, not surprisingly given that 
Derrida correctly realized that once the very 
possibility of truth has been banished, the 
“play of signification” is extended precisely to 
infinity (1207).   
Here is the point:  Lewis would want 
to ask of the claim that, by the very nature of 
discourse, questions of truth are endlessly 
deferred, “Is it true?  Does it correspond to 
the way things actually are in the real world?”  
And this is a question that Derrida, for 
example, would have had to refuse to answer; 
it is a question that simply has no meaning in 
his system.  If we accepted the Deconstructive 
analysis, we would have to limit ourselves to 
questions of race, gender, class, and power 
too, for the truth question would be 
unaskable.  So the question whether a view of 
truth can itself be true (or false) turns out to 
be pretty basic.  Can we correct the New York 
in our heads by the one in the American 
Northeast, or are we rendered unable to do 
so, trapped inside our heads, whether by 
Kantian categories or by the specious 
language games preferred by Post-Modern 
intellectuals?  Putting off for the moment a 
field trip to the Big Apple, we can realize that 
there is no question as to which side of that 
divide Lewis occupied. 
Not all people who have held the 
correspondence theory of truth have been 
theists.  But Christian theism if accepted does 
provide a solid grounding for such a view of 
truth.  If we believe in a personal and rational 
God who not only acts but speaks, and who 
has created our finite minds in His image, 
then it is easier to conceive of truth as both 
existing and knowable.  There is a stable 
reality to which our propositions can 
correspond, and our minds were designed to 
deal with that reality by the same Mind that 
designed it.  If God exists and has spoken, 
then He is Himself the ultimate source of 
truth, and His Word the ultimate criterion of 
truth.  The complaint that there is no “God’s 
eye view of the world” is then simply based 
on a false premise.  There is one; God has it; 
and He has communicated at least some parts 
of it to us.  All truth then comes from Him, 
either directly or indirectly.  Lewis of course 
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lived comfortably in this world:  “Whatever 
was true in Akhenaton’s creed came to him, in 
some mode or other, as all truth comes to all 
men, from God” (Reflections 86). 
So far Lewis is solidly in the 
mainstream of Christian thinking about truth.  
Augustine and Aquinas, Calvin and Wesley, 
Cardinal Newman and Carl F. H. Henry would 
all have affirmed these basic points, though 
not perhaps with Lewis’s characteristically 
deft use of apt analogy.  What Lewis adds to 
the discussion is some careful thinking about 
the relations of truth not only to reason but 
also to imagination.  It was his experience and 
his conviction that “All things, in their way, 
reflect heavenly truth, imagination not least” 
(Surprised 167).  How exactly does 
imagination do so? 
Some of Lewis’s interpreters, 
influenced perhaps by the surface 
resemblance in language between Lewis and 
the English Romantics, have not paid 
sufficiently careful attention to how Lewis 
answers that question.  One reads vague 
statements like “Truth flows into a person 
through the imagination” (Uszynski 247) and 
even more inexact summaries like the 
following:  “Lewis, like many Romantics, 
intuitively trusted the capacity of imagination 
to be a ‘faculty of truth’” (Tixier 141).  What 
Lewis actually said was much more carefully 
and rigorously thought out:     
We are not talking about truth but 
meaning: meaning which is the 
antecedent condition of both truth and 
falsehood, whose antithesis is not error 
but nonsense.  I am a rationalist.  For 
me, reason is the natural organ of truth; 
but imagination is the organ of 
meaning.  Imagination, producing new 
metaphors or revivifying old, is not the 
cause of truth, but its condition.  
(“Bluspels” 265). 
 Imagination is the faculty or organ not 
of truth (directly) but of meaning, which is 
the “antecedent condition” of truth.  What 
does this mean?  Suppose I utter the 
proposition, “Blepple hloisats kleply flarg 
krunk bluzzles,” and then ask you for a 
verdict on its truth or falsehood.  I suspect 
you would be somewhat handicapped in 
trying to render that verdict by the fact that 
you would have no idea what I had said.  
Before you could even begin to form a 
judgment on the truth question, you would 
need to know what a hloisat is, how a blepple 
one differs from a regular one, what it is to 
flarg, what a bluzzle is, what is the quality of 
krunkness, and how flarging kleply differs 
from regular flarging.  In order to give you 
that information I would have to render these 
objects, qualities, and actions in concrete 
terms that you could visualize.  Your 
Imagination would be the faculty that enabled 
you to form a picture—an image—of what the 
proposition is asserting (or whether it is 
asserting anything).  Then your Reason would 
compare that mental picture to the picture of 
reality it has already tested and come to trust, 
in order to see if correspondence or 
contradiction resulted.   
 Imagination, in other words, doesn’t 
give us truth, contrary to what Tixier implies.  
Just because we can imagine something does 
not make it real.  But Imagination combined 
with Reason can give us meaningful truth, 
truth that impacts us on other levels than 
mere academic intellectual assent. This is 
truth that can appeal to head and heart 
together.  Lewis was the master of giving it to 
us, whether in his expository prose or his 
fiction.  The hall and rooms of a house for the 
church and its denominations; two books 
which have always been resting one on the 
other for the eternal generation of the Son; 
the keys of a piano and a tune for the 
relationship between our instincts and the 
moral law; entrusting oneself to the waves 
and floating islands of Perelandra rather than 
sleeping on the fixed land for faith; the Stone 
Table for the Law and Aslan’s death cracking 
it for the Gospel; Reepicheep the Mouse for 
valor, chivalry, and honor:  The brilliant 
artistic construction of these images does not 
prove that they are images of truth.  But their 
presence in the context of the linear 
arguments and narrative trajectories of which 
they are a part makes the truths established 
by those lines of development mean 
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something; it makes their impact, their 
beauty, and their relevance easier to see and 
to feel.    
   Mythology for Lewis was one of the 
most important places where this 
contribution of imagination to our ability to 
grasp the meaning of true (or false) 
propositions is seen.  It is well known that for 
Lewis myth was not the opposite of truth, as 
it is in popular usage, but rather one way in 
which truth can be conveyed or embodied.  
Myth is not necessarily “lies breathed through 
silver” (as the pre-conversion Lewis once 
foolishly said to Tolkien), but can be “a real 
though unfocused gleam of divine truth 
falling on human imagination” (Tolkien 54; 
Lewis, Miracles 139n.).  Myth may then 
convey these truths to the imaginations of 
readers, who might then independently verify 
them through reason and hence validly accept 
them as true.  Thus George MacDonald’s 
modern mythic stories helped move Lewis in 
the direction of Christian faith by giving a 
meaning to the concept of holiness, even as 
Lewis’s own stories have done for countless 
readers since.  The mythical quality of the 
story refers in Lewis’s usage to its 
meaningfulness rather than its truth or 
falsehood as such, which must be established 
on other grounds.  Hence Lewis could without 
contradiction refer to the New Testament 
story of Jesus’ birth, death, and resurrection 
as “myth become fact” (67). 
Lewis is careful to use this language 
correctly even in his fiction. “Long since on 
Mars, and more strongly since he came to 
Perelandra, Ransom had been perceiving that 
the triple distinction of truth from myth and 
both from fact was purely terrestrial—was 
part and parcel of that unhappy division 
between soul and body that resulted from the 
Fall” (Perelandra 143-4, cf. “Myth Became 
Fact” 66).  Fact in this passage is the bit of 
reality that truth is about; truth the account 
that corresponds to that reality; myth the 
story that allows us to taste the particular 
tang of that fact (“Myth Became Fact” 66).  
Ransom experiences in Perelandra the pre-
analytical unity that lies behind the 
distinguished categories.     
When one is inside a myth, in other 
words—say, on Perelandra with Ransom—
one experiences the unified reality from 
which all three flow. When talking about that 
experience later, one has perforce to use the 
distinguished language, and Lewis does so 
consistently.  He was doing so even in his 
earliest Christian fiction: “Child, if you will, it 
is mythology.  It is but truth, not fact; an 
image, not the very real” (Regress 171).  A 
true statement about reality is not reality; not 
even a mythical statement is reality; but it 
may be true nonetheless, i.e., it may 
correspond to that reality in a faithful 
manner.  Because the meaningful creating 
and sustaining acts of a personal, purposeful, 
and rational God are the ultimate source of all 
reality, there is indeed a real unity between 
fact and truth, and between both and myth, 
the most meaningful statement of truth. 
Wolfe captures it well: “Ransom’s education 
has led him to see that it is not merely the 
idyllic worlds of Malacandra and Perelandra 
which are ‘mythological,’ but that reality 
itself, when perceived truly, is as dense with 
meaning as myth” (Wolfe 68).  And some of 
this meaning may be stated propositionally, 
and some of those propositions may be 
confirmed by Reason as true. 
 Lewis then embraces the traditional 
and standard correspondence theory of truth 
and enriches it by relating truth to 
imagination and myth.  Truth is a property of 
accounts or propositions such that their 
assertions correspond with reality.  
Imagination is the organ of meaning, the 
antecedent condition of truth or falsehood, 
i.e., of the meaningfulness of those accounts 
claiming to be true or false.  Reason, which 
distinguishes and discerns correspondence or 
non-correspondence (between those 
propositions and each other, between them 
and reality) and pursues their implications, is 
the organ of truth. Myth is a story that 
enables the imagination to receive and taste 
ways of seeing the world that reason can then 
confirm as true or false.   
 This view of truth, traditional and 
standard, was already under attack in Lewis’s 
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own day, and that attack has only intensified 
since.  How did he defend it? 
 
THE DEFENSE OF TRUTH 
 
 Above we raised the question 
whether a view of truth can itself be true.  It is 
time to see how Lewis answered that 
question in the case of the correspondence 
theory of truth.  He gives two basic reasons 
why we should accept the correspondence 
theory of truth as true.  First, it cannot be 
denied without self contradiction. Second, it 
corresponds to the way in which people do in 
fact come to true knowledge about the world. 
 Lewis advanced the argument from 
self contradiction in many ways and in many 
contexts.  The most well known and fully 
developed place is the chapter of Miracles 
originally titled “The Self Contradiction of the 
Naturalist.”  Attempts to answer technical 
objections raised by Elizabeth Anscombe 
when the argument was presented at the 
Oxford Socratic Club caused the water in that 
chapter to be muddied a bit in later editions, 
with the title changing to the “Cardinal 
Difficulty” of Naturalism.  Either way, the 
argument is that Naturalism must itself be 
false because it participates in the inevitable 
self-refutation of all views that entail radical 
skepticism.  (See Reppert for a fine history 
and evaluation of the Anscombe debate.)    
 A good summation of the argument 
appears in the essay “De Futilitate”:    
Can we carry through to the end the 
view that human thought is merely 
human: that it is simply a zoological 
fact about homo sapiens that he thinks 
in a certain way; that it in no way 
reflects . . . universal reality?  The 
moment we ask this question we 
receive a check.  We are at this very 
point asking whether a certain view of 
human thought is true.  And the view in 
question is just the view that human 
thought is not true, not a reflection of 
reality. . . . In other words, we are 
asking, “Is the thought that no thoughts 
are true, itself true?”  If we answer Yes, 
we contradict ourselves. . . . There is 
therefore no question of a total 
skepticism about human thought.  (“De 
Futilitate” 60-61) 
If true statements do not correspond to real 
states of affairs in the external world, if they 
are not “reflections of reality,” then the very 
claim that truth is not a reflection of reality 
does not correspond to the way things 
actually are either, and thus it self-destructs.  
This is so whether the reason why we 
allegedly cannot know that some statements 
accurately reflect reality is the physical 
determinism entailed by naturalism (Lewis’s 
opponent in Miracles), the cynicism of the 
Greek sophists, or the linguistic solipsism of 
Post-Modern Deconstructionists. 
 Lewis’s usual foil was naturalism.  If 
Nature is all that there is, then the laws of 
physics—not the laws of logic—determine 
everything.  The thoughts I am having are 
mere chemical reactions taking place in my 
head, determined solely by the movements of 
atoms set in random motion by purposeless 
and unintelligent processes ages ago.  But, 
then, so are the thoughts of the person who 
disagrees with me.  “What we called his 
thought was essentially a phenomenon of the 
same sort as his other secretions—the form 
which the vast irrational process of nature 
was bound to take at a particular point of 
space and time” (“Religion without Dogma” 
136).  Who is to decide between these two 
chemical reactions?  A third chemical reaction 
produced by the same random, purposeless 
processes?  This takes us nowhere.  So Lewis 
quotes J. B. S. Haldane:  “If my mental 
processes are determined wholly by the 
motions of atoms in my brain, I have no 
reason to suppose that my beliefs are true . . . 
and hence I have no reason for supposing my 
brain to be composed of atoms” (Miracles 22).  
Lewis agreed.  If naturalism were true, it 
would be have to be false.  For if it is true, 
then 
All our present thoughts are mere 
accidents—the accidental by-product of 
the movement of atoms.  And this holds 
for the thoughts of the materialists and 
astronomers as well as for anyone 
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else’s.  But if their thoughts—i.e., of 
Materialism and Astronomy—are 
merely accidental by-products, whey 
should we believe them to be true?  I 
see no reason for believing that one 
accident should be able to give me a 
correct account of all the other 
accidents.  (“Answers” 52-3) 
It follows then that 
At least one kind of thought—logical 
thought—cannot be subjective and 
irrelevant to the real universe: for 
unless thought is valid we have no 
reason to believe in the real universe. . . 
. I conclude then that logic is a real 
insight into the way in which real 
things have to exist.  In other words, 
the laws of thought are the laws of 
things. (“De Futilitate” 63) 
That thought be logical is a necessary 
but not a sufficient condition of truth that is 
known to be truth.  A proposition that 
someone holds may just happen to be true; it 
may be true by luck.  But unless it has a 
logical basis, we cannot know it to be true.  
And a proposition may be logically consistent 
or coherent without corresponding to 
external reality.  To maintain a belief in 
knowable truth, in other words, we must have 
more than logic but cannot have less.  Thus 
we can be certain that “No account of the 
universe can be true unless that account 
leaves it possible for our thinking to be a real 
insight” (Miracles 20). 
 The correspondence theory of truth 
itself then is not only logically consistent; it is 
logically necessary if there is to be any 
knowable truth at all.  Furthermore, it 
matches the way people actually come to 
discover and hold truth.  How do we actually 
come to know truth?  The additional element 
that we have to add to logic is experience.  
There is a real New York that transcends any 
of our perceptions of New York (the New 
York “in my own head” that we saw above) 
and is capable of correcting those perceptions 
and adjudicating between them.  If we do not 
know which picture of the city is more 
accurate, we can go and look. 
 But can we really?  Post-Modern 
theory argues that we cannot step outside of 
our perceptions to experience the New York 
an sich because the perception we receive 
through experience is itself mediated through 
our background, our beliefs, our language, 
and our situatedness.  There is no such thing 
as uninterpreted experience; any experience 
to which we might appeal has already been 
interpreted, so that there is no “God’s eye 
view” from which our perceptions can be 
evaluated and no final conclusion that can be 
reached about what reality is in itself outside 
our perceptions.  As Derrida famously put it, 
“There is nothing outside the text.”  
Was Lewis then caught in a naïve 
Modernism so that his appeals to reason and 
experience are simply passé?  He never had 
the opportunity to respond to thinkers like 
Derrida, of course.  But he was confronted by 
earlier forms of cultural and epistemological 
relativism, and so we can easily imagine what 
his response might have been.  Radical 
skepticism is no less self refuting when it is 
based on clever theories about language than 
when it is based on philosophical or scientific 
naturalism. It cannot be true without 
untruthing itself; therefore, it cannot be true.  
In the case of Post-Modern forms of this 
sophistry, Lewis might have noted the 
prevalence of reductionistic thinking.  The 
demonstration that we cannot avoid having 
our thinking influenced by our language, race, 
gender, class, etc., is mysteriously elevated 
(while no one is looking) into the conclusion 
that our thinking must perforce be 
determined by those influences.  The fact that 
we normally define language by using other 
language is extrapolated into the theory that 
language only refers to other language and 
has no ability to refer to anything outside of 
language.  But as Smith points out, 
Language . . . is the only means we have 
of making truth claims.  Likewise, it is 
the only means we have of debating the 
veracity of such claims.  Unless we wish 
to give over the entire business of 
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making and challenging claims to truth, 
we must accept the referentiality of 
language, metaphoricity and all.  
Otherwise, we must be ready to admit 
that statements such as “Metaphor is 
nonreferential” do not refer to anything 
except themselves.  Such would 
probably be the starting point of any 
defense Lewis might make of the 
referentiality of metaphor. (22). 
Can the real New York ever, even 
potentially, break through all these influences 
to smack us in the face with reality?  Our 
experience tells us that, whatever the dictates 
of Theory to the contrary may be, in fact it 
can, if we just step out of the ivory tower into 
the street.  Lewis’s attitude toward 
experience, and toward the external world 
which provides us with those experiences, is 
therefore quite refreshing compared to the 
suffocating claustrophobia of much current 
thinking:       
What I like about experience is that it is 
such an honest thing.  You may take any 
number of wrong turnings; but keep 
your eyes open and you will not be 
allowed to go very far before the 
warning signs appear.  You may have 
deceived yourself, but experience is not 
trying to deceive you.  The universe 
rings true wherever you fairly test it. 
(Surprised 177) 
Truth then is a property of 
propositions such that they correspond to 
real states of affairs in a real world.  We hold 
to this view because to deny it is self refuting 
and because reality rewards us in the search 
for truth in such terms when we approach it 
fairly.  One must assume these truths even to 
argue against them.  And the best response to 
those theories that seem to compromise or 
deny them is not just counter-theorizing, but 
stepping outside of the ivory tower into the 
street to allow the real New York to do its 
work.   
THE RELEVANCE OF TRUTH 
 
 Lewis not only expounds the 
correspondence theory of truth, enriches it by 
relating it to imagination as well as reason, 
and defends it successfully; he also has a lot 
to say about its implications for life and 
thought. 
 First, if we are confident in the 
existence of truth and the ability of human 
minds to know it, we are liberated from 
chronological snobbery.  We are freed from 
the provincialism of the biases of our own age 
to become citizens of history and receive 
truth from any mind in any time, not just 
those who share the perspectives of our own 
limited “situatedness.”  “Space does not stink 
because it has preserved its three dimensions 
from the beginning.  The square of the 
hypotenuse has not gone mouldy by 
continuing to equal the square of the other 
two sides” (“Poison” 76).  Truth becomes 
something we can find and hold on to.  Only if 
it is reduced to perspective does it change 
into something else by the mere passage of 
time.  
 Second, it is impossible fully to 
understand human nature or to seek its 
fulfillment without a robust understanding of 
the nature of truth and confidence in its 
reality.  In The Abolition of Man, human 
beings are those creatures who live not by 
instinct but by understanding of the Tao.  
Lewis agreed with Aristotle that all men 
naturally desire to know:  “One of the things 
that distinguishes man from the other 
animals is that he wants to know things, 
wants to find out what reality is like, simply 
for the sake of knowing.  When that desire is 
completely quenched in anyone, I think he 
has become something less than human” 
(“Man or Rabbit?” 108).  
 A human being divorced from the 
quest for truth is less than human because 
human beings were created in the image of 
the God of truth, for fellowship with the God 
of truth, which entails not just the knowledge 
but also the embracing of truth and the 
rejection of the lie.  This fact makes our 
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orientation toward truth a matter not just of 
fulfillment but of moral obligation. 
When Professor Price defended 
scientists, speaking of their devotion to 
truth and their constant following of 
the best light they knew, it seemed to 
him that he was choosing an attitude in 
obedience to an ideal.  He did not feel 
that he was merely suffering a reaction 
determined by ultimately amoral and 
irrational sources, and no more capable 
of rightness or wrongness than a hiccup 
or a sneeze.  (“Religion without Dogma” 
137) 
Lewis approves of this stance, even though 
Price may not have realized that his attitude 
ultimately flows from the relation of the 
creature to the Creator who is the God of 
truth.  It is the duty of true humanity to feel 
this way: “Every free man wants truth as well 
as life: . . . a mere life-addict is no more 
respectable than a cocaine addict” (Miracles 
24).   
Therefore, to acquiesce in the mere 
freeplay of perspectives rather than pursuing 
the search for truth is to betray the purpose 
for which our minds were created.  In a 
passage that prophetically anticipates a Post-
Modern buzz word, the liberal bishop in The 
Great Divorce is warned, “Thirst was made for 
water; inquiry for truth.  What you now call 
the free play of inquiry has neither more nor 
less to do with the ends for which intelligence 
was given you than masturbation has to do 
with marriage” (44).  The choice of metaphor 
is not only daring but telling.  Truth was 
intended to be experienced not just as an 
intellectual abstraction but as a participation 
in reality that has union with the ultimate 
Reality, the Source of all reality, as its end.  
The rejection of truth is finally a rejection of 
that union, a form of spiritual adultery.  Every 
philosophy that reduces truth to merely a 
subjective mind state dehumanizes us and 
cuts us off not only from God, but from all that 
is good and real.  As the George MacDonald 
character in The Great Divorce explains, 
“Every state of mind, left to itself, every 
shutting up of the creature within the 
dungeon of his own mind—is, in the end, Hell.  
But Heaven is not a state of mind.  Heaven is 
reality itself” (Great Divorce 69).  The Dwarfs 
in The Last Battle, clinging to the stable-litter 
of their minds, are a graphic picture of this 
epistemological captivity. 
Flowing from all this is a third point:  
Seeking and finding and embracing the truth 
is not a matter just of intellectual curiosity 
but of moral and spiritual life and death.  The 
importance of truth cannot be overstated in 
this view.  And because truth flows from the 
creative decrees of the spiritual God who 
created the material world, the true 
propositions whose embrace is so crucial to 
us correspond not just to physical reality but 
to the unseen realities, to morals and values, 
as well.  This means that, as in the argument 
of The Abolition of Man, morals and values are 
objective realities, not just subjective feelings 
or perspectives.  Therefore, “Unless we return 
to the crude and nursery-like belief in 
objective values, we perish” (“Poison” 81). 
The most critical truth to be 
embraced or refused is of course the truth 
about the God from whom the world of reality 
flows.  Every person therefore has a moral 
obligation to consider the claims of the 
Christian faith very seriously—whether or 
not he or she sees any immediate pragmatic 
benefit in holding those beliefs.  This above all 
is not a merely academic discussion.   
Christianity claims to give you an 
account of facts—to tell you what the 
real universe is like.  Its account of the 
universe may be true, or it may not, and 
once the question is really before you, 
then your natural inquisitiveness must 
make you want to know the answer.  If 
Christianity is untrue, then no honest 
man will want to believe it, however 
helpful it might be; if it is true, every 
honest man will want to believe it, even 
if it gives him no help at all. (“Man or 
Rabbit?” 108-9) 
Truth comes before any use we might 
make of it, and we find it only when we 
recognize that fact.  “If you look for truth, you 
may find comfort in the end.  If you look for 
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comfort, you will not get either comfort or 
truth—only soft soap and wishful thinking to 
begin with, and in the end, despair” (Mere 
Christianity 39).  Though the search for truth 
is a value in itself that supersedes any 
pragmatic benefit that might come from 
finding it, there is of course pragmatic benefit 
to knowing and embracing the truth: comfort, 
perhaps, and more important things besides. 
“If Christianity should happen to be true, then 
it is quite impossible that those who know 
this truth and those who don’t should be 
equally well equipped for leading a good life” 
(“Man or Rabbit?” 109).   But there is 
something even greater at stake than how 
good a life we might lead:  
Here is a door, behind which, according 
to some people, the secret of the 
universe is waiting for you.  Either 
that’s true, or it isn’t.  And if it isn’t, 
then what the door really conceals is 
simply the greatest fraud, the most 
colossal “sell,” on record.  Isn’t it 
obviously the job of every man (that is 
a man and not a rabbit) to try to find 
out which, and then to devote his full 
energies either to serving this 
tremendous secret or to exposing and 
destroying this gigantic humbug?  
(“Man or Rabbit?” 112) 
 Lewis devoted his life to “serving this 
tremendous secret,” to living, explaining, and 
defending the Christian faith.  The fourth 
implication of Lewis’s view of truth as he 
develops it is what it means for living the 
Christian life.  To believe in truth and take it 
seriously is to make the quest for truth 
paramount not only in deciding to become a 
Christian, but also in those decisions one 
makes because one is a Christian—for 
example, the choice of a church or a 
denomination.  Applying his analogy of the 
church as a house with its hall and rooms, 
Lewis advises, “Above all you should be 
asking which door is the true one; not which 
pleases you best by its paint and paneling.  In 
plain language, the question should never be: 
‘Do I like that kind of service?’ but ‘Are these 
doctrines true?’” (Mere Christianity 12).   
 If truth is central to what Christianity 
is, then we have to understand the central 
Christian act—belief—in terms of our 
concept of truth.  Faith becomes something 
oriented to truth, a stance one takes toward 
the truth.  If this is so, it becomes harder to 
think of faith as a primarily emotional 
response, or as unrelated to specific 
propositions about God and the world, or as 
the inclination to affirm as true propositions 
that would otherwise not commend 
themselves as such.  Faith is trust in a Person 
which causes us, not merely to acknowledge, 
but to embrace as true, those ideas and facts 
about that Person which we have come to 
believe (in Lewis’s case, on what he thought 
were good grounds) that He has revealed to 
us.  Faith adds the emotional and personal 
element of trust and commitment to what 
would otherwise be a merely notional 
relationship to those propositions.  That is 
why Lewis can say, “I define Faith as the 
power of continuing to believe what we once 
honestly thought to be true until cogent 
reasons for honestly changing our minds are 
brought before us” (“Religion: Reality or 
Substitute?” 42). He devotes an entire essay, 
“On Obstinacy in Belief,” to explaining this 
relational element as the reason why the 
Christian’s belief, once established, does not 
waver with “every fluctuation of the apparent 
evidence” (29).  For one who holds Lewis’s 
classical view of truth, then, faith is 
something that is more than propositional 
and evidential, but it can never be less. 
 Faith then is a stance toward certain 
propositions seen in relation to the Person 
who is believed to have revealed them, which 
embraces them as true not as a matter of 
opinion but of trust and commitment.  The 
lack of evidence is not what constitutes this 
stance as belief or faith rather than 
knowledge.  Lewis (and many others) have 
thought the evidence quite good.  But the fact 
that the particular relationship to which these 
beliefs lead and which they nurture is the 
rather overwhelming and life-changing one of 
creature to Creator, sinner to Savior, and 
servant to absolute Sovereign—a relationship 
infinitely satisfying to many who embrace it 
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but daunting enough in prospect to have 
caused Lewis to describe his conversion as 
being dragged kicking and screaming into the 
Kingdom—means that there is a lot more 
going on than the mere disinterested perusal 
of evidence.  There are many more sources 
for doubt than lack of irrefutable evidence.  
So Lewis can see faith as the support of 
reason as much as the other way around:    
Religion may win truths; without Faith 
she will retain them just so long as 
Satan pleases. . . . If we wish to be 
rational, not now and then, but 
constantly, we must pray for the gift of 
Faith, for the power to go on believing 
not in the teeth of reason but in the 
teeth of lust and terror and jealousy 
and boredom and indifference that 
which reason, authority, or experience, 
or all three, have once delivered to us 
for truth.  (“Religion: Reality or 
Substitute” 43) 
 Truth then for the Christian is a 
serious intellectual matter that can never be 
only intellectual.  It is at the heart of our 
created humanity and of its fulfillment in 
relationship to its Creator.  In a healthy and 
whole human being, truth simultaneously 
informs the intellect, inspires the emotions, 
and energizes the will.  Lewis would have 
understood Bacon:   
The inquiry of truth, which is the 
lovemaking or wooing of it, the 
knowledge of truth, which is the 
presence of it, and the belief of truth, 
which is the enjoying of it, is the 
sovereign good of human nature. . . . 
Certainly it is heaven upon earth to 
have a man’s mind move in charity, rest 
in providence, and turn upon the poles 
of truth. (Bacon 40)   
It is not just reason and imagination that are 
unified by Lewis’s holistic view of truth; it is 
head and heart, being and doing, and every 
other aspect of our humanity as well.  That 
unity is well expressed by Lewis’s final bit of 
advice:  “A man can’t always be defending the 
truth; there must be a time to feed on it” 
(Reflections 7).  In his fiction, his poetry, and 
his expository writing, Lewis helps us to do 




 C. S. Lewis’s exposition of truth, its 
nature, its grounds, and its implications, is 
increasingly a voice crying in a wilderness of 
radical perspectivalism.  Various forms of 
reductionism today conspire to render truth 
claims nothing more than subjective 
responses and cynical power plays.  Sadly, so 
pervasive is this way of thinking, so cloaked 
in the robes of academic sophistication and 
respectability, that even some Christians have 
inconsistently acquiesced in such views and 
helped to perpetuate them.  Lewis can help us 
see what is at stake as well as provide a 
roadmap back to sanity.   
The materialist reductionism Lewis 
battled is still with us.  Reppert, for example, 
critiques thinkers like Patricia Churchland 
who think that evolutionary explanations of 
the nervous system render the concept of 
truth otiose:  “Either truth is our highest 
epistemic goal and there is a state of the 
person called ‘believing truly,’ or else we have 
no epistemic goal and we can engage in 
various cognitive projects without being held 
to an absolute standard by which those 
projects can be judged” (77).  To that 
materialist reductionism have now been 
added other forms of cultural and linguistic 
reductionism with similar or even more 
deadly effects.  Edwards notes,  
Some recent composition theorists 
have come to view their task as 
stripping away the illusions that 
language can capture and bear witness 
to “truth” or “reality.” . . . The purpose 
of writing instruction under the new 
literacy regimes is to prepare the 
writer to recognize and inhabit the 
world of “truths” that he himself 
creates, as opposed to the world of 
truths he might discover outside 
himself. . . . Lewis would regard these 
views as a retreat to a Gnosticism that 
not only does not shield humankind 
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from manipulation or error, but instead 
guarantees error by undermining the 
ontological status of knowledge and 
belief. (103) 
 Those who still aspire to the 
wholeness of an examined life and connection 
to a reality greater than themselves will find 
in Lewis a stout defender of the legitimacy 
and necessity of that quest, and an 
experienced guide to lead us in it.  Is truth 
when we find it in the world a reflection of 
God’s mind, goodness of His character, and 
beauty of His glory, impressed into the very 
fabric of what He has made?  C. S. Lewis not 
only explains why we should think so; he lets 
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